# Appendix C

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## The Methods of Antireligious Propaganda among the Muslims

From *Zhizn' Natsional'nostei*, 29(127) and 30(128), 1921.

The problem of methods of antireligious propaganda among the Muslims is very delicate and complex because of the place Islam occupies in Muslim life and because of the general social and political situation of Muslim peoples.

Naturally, for us communists, there is no doubt as to the necessity of antireligious propaganda, not only among the Muslims of Russia, but also beyond her frontiers. To us, all religions are the same. On this level the problem is clear and no analysis is necessary.

The difficulty appears only where methods of achieving the desired results as quickly and with as little suffering as possible are concerned.

Now, one can't hope to defeat an adversary without knowing him. To fight a force, whatever its nature, without knowledge of it, is to risk at least failure if not outright defeat. Therefore, before discussing methods used in the antireligious battle among Muslims, one should define Islam, if only in the broadest terms, and then see if the methods of propaganda established by revolutionary practice against other religions are valid here.

In analyzing this last point it becomes evident that for multiple reasons special methods should be employed in the antireligious campaign among the Muslims. For these same reasons, different methods should be adopted when dealing with different Muslim peoples.

The essential factor which determines the position of Islam is its youthful-

ness. Of all the "great religions" of the world, Islam is the youngest and therefore the most solid and the strongest as far as influence is concerned. All serious European Islamicists have recognized this fact. Islam has best preserved social and political elements, whereas the other religions emphasize above all ethnic and religious elements. Muslim law—the Shariy'at—is a code of law and of judicial norms that regulates all aspects of the earthly life of the believer. In it we find directions on how to pray, how to conduct oneself at work, in society, in the family, and in everyday life, down to the smallest detail. Moreover, many of its prescriptions have a clear-cut, positive character.

Suffice it to recall the obligatory nature of its instructions (the *hadith* of Mohammed: *Utlibu l-'ilma min al-mahdi ila-l-lahdi* [Aspire to knowledge from cradle to grave]); the duty to engage in trade and to work (*kasab*); the duty of parents to educate their children until they come of age; the institution of civil marriage; the absence of private property in lands, waters, and forests; the condemnation of superstitions; the prohibition of sorcery, games of chance, luxury, extravagance, jewelry in gold and silk clothing, the use of alcoholic beverages, usury, and cannibalism (the last point was important in North Africa); the establishment of a detailed and progressive system of taxes on produce and on goods (*Zakat, ushr*, and so on).

Even family law and the law of succession in Islam contained positive principles, for they regularized, at the time they were elaborated and even later, the anarchical situation of the pagan Arabs. Thus, for example, Islamicists consider the *hadith* of Mohammed on polygamy to be an expression of his desire to limit it.

Insofar as it is a religion comprising social and political motifs, Islam penetrates the spirit of the believer more deeply than other religions; it is therefore a more difficult and delicate task to combat its influence. The best proof of this lies in the personal position of Muslim clergymen, which is much more solid than that of representatives of other religions.

Take, for example, the situation of the Muslim clergy among us in Russia. Whereas among Russians we find one parish for every 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants, among Muslims there is one mosque for every 700 to 1,000 souls and each mosque is served by at least three members of the clergy: the *mullah*, his assistant, and the *muezzin*.

The strength of the Muslim clergy can also be explained by reason of its social and political position among the Muslim population. The *mullah* is at the same time priest (in charge of religious rites), teacher (each *mullah* has a religious school connected to his mosque: *mektep* or *medresseh*), administrator (in charge of regulating estates, registering civil acts of state), judge

(competent in affairs of marriage, divorce, and succession), and at times even a doctor of medicine.

Furthermore, the Muslim clergy are elected and this places them in a more favorable and solid position than, for example, the Russian clergy. The Russian priest, appointed by the superior authorities, certainly has a lesser authority over his flock than does the Tatar *mullah* or the Uzbek *ulema* in his *mahalle*. The latter consider themselves just the same to be "servants of the people" and lend an attentive ear to their wishes. They are more democratic and closer to the people, and exercise a greater influence on them than does the village priest over the Russian *muzhik*.

The second factor which makes antireligious propaganda difficult among the Muslims is the social and economic situation of all Muslim peoples during the latter centuries. The decadence of Arab culture and of Turko-Tatar culture (expulsion of the Arabs from Spain and the Turko-Tatars from southwest Europe, conquest by Europeans of Muslim possessions in North Africa and the Middle East, Russian domination of the Tatars, the Bashkirs, the mountain peoples of the Caucasus and of the Turkic principalities of Central Asia) has led to the political and economic submission of nearly all the 300 million Muslims of the world.

During the course of the last century the whole of the Muslim world was exploited by West European imperialism and served as the material base of its economy. This fact has profoundly marked the religion of the Muslims. The expansion of western imperialism manifested itself first in the form of the Crusades and later by economic conquest. But the majority of Muslims always felt this battle to be a political conflict, that is to say as a battle against Islam as a whole. Moreover, the reverse would have been impossible, for in the eyes of Muslims, the Muslim world forms an indivisible whole, without distinction, nationality, or tribe.

Because of this, Islam was and still is, at least in the eyes of Muslims, an oppressed religion forced to be on the defensive. In other words, the historical evolution of Islam fosters a feeling of solidarity among the diverse groups of the faithful and lends force to its proselytizing. These conditions make the anti-Islamic campaign a difficult one.

In Russia the task is even more arduous, for in spreading antireligious propaganda among the Muslims we risk comparison with the recent "adversaries of Islam"—the Russian missionaries who spent millions from public funds in this "battle." It was not long ago that these inveterate reactionaries swarmed over all the Muslim regions of Russia and spread throughout them the nauseating odor of missionary corruption. Lately, moreover, these territories were covered with a dense network of "scholarly establishments,"

seminaries and religious academies destined to form "specialists" in the battle against "Mohammedism." Inept antireligious propaganda runs the risk of evoking this recent past in the Muslim mind and would only have very negative results.

Finally, when discussing the difficulties of anti-Muslim propaganda another important factor should be noted: the cultural backwardness of Muslims in general. We are not going to dwell on the subject, for no one denies that cultural backwardness and religious fanaticism go hand in hand, completing and mutually reinforcing each other.

Thus, the particular position of Islam, which can be explained on the one hand by its greater vitality due to its late appearance and on the other hand by the psychological state of the oppressed or only lately liberated Muslim peoples (the Muslims of Russia), necessitates an approach and new methods of antireligious propaganda.

What should these methods be?

First of all the problem must be faced prudently, in a spirit of practicality. Any bureaucracy and any aggressiveness should be avoided. The issue should not be one of an antireligious battle, but rather of antireligious propaganda. Once and for all we must wrest from our adversaries the weapons with which they can defeat us. We must proclaim loudly that we are fighting no religion as such, but wish only to propagate our atheistic convictions, as is our natural right. This kind of approach alone can ensure that we will not be confused with the retrograde Russian missionaries. We must make the Muslims understand that in spreading antireligious propaganda we are not continuing the work of the Pobedonostsev and of the Il'minski, but rather that of their own intellectuals, who recently, moreover, had been working in this same direction.

Then we must purge our ranks, once and for all, of the old missionaries, if indeed they have managed to infiltrate, and put Muslim communists in charge of organizing antireligious propaganda. On no account should bunglers or especially charlatans have any hand in this. It would only serve to discredit us in the eyes of the Muslim populace.

In the third place, antireligious propaganda requires a great deal of competence and should be undertaken in a practical manner. It is not enough to publish brochures or little articles with pretentious titles (no one will read them) or to organize conferences; we must carry on the campaign in daily life, by our example and activities; in other words, we must replace verbal agitation with acts of agitation. The person whom we wish to influence must never be aware that we are preparing to submit him to antireligious propaganda. Otherwise, alarmed and put off in advance, he will shy away from us. In this

regard, the simple presence in a Muslim village or among Muslim workers of one true communist (atheist) who firmly disregards established Muslim rites would be more useful than many conferences or talks given by the most eloquent and convincing of orators. Muslims must become accustomed to having real atheists living in their midst. They must be put into close contact with someone who denies the existence of God and must be made to see this person as a positive, rather than a negative creature. They must understand that the atheist is not a devil in human guise as is customarily depicted, but rather a man like themselves—more positive, more cultured, more resolute, and more energetic. If you can manage all of this, then ideological victory is yours. Only the first step is crucial; the rest will be easy.

The actual method of conducting antireligious propaganda in Muslim provinces shows this exposé to be correct.

A mediocre agitator arrives in a village; he is a ferocious-looking Tatar, dark and threatening, with masses of long hair, a revolver and sword in his belt. He begins by insulting "Allah and his prophets," displays his "furious" atheism by stamping on the Koran or some other book considered sacred by the Muslims:

> You see, I trample the Koran and nothing happens. Therefore, this book is not sacred, therefore there is no Allah, etc.

The outbursts of these pseudoagitators produce the most disastrous impression on the population. "We wanted to seize and kill him on the spot," the peasants of one Tatar village told me, speaking of one such "orator," "but we changed our minds through fear that a punitive expedition would be sent against us for having killed a 'bulshavik.'"

On the other hand, they spoke in humorous tones, totally devoid of malice, and with sincere delight, of a talk given by a traveling Russian Bolshevik who told them funny stories about the village priests and the *mullahs*. "He was gay and simple and made us laugh; he explained to us how the Russian priests fool the people; and among ourselves we thought that our own *mullahs* are also crooks."

Such is the reality of life and we can't ignore it. I witnessed another case: in a Bashkir village, on the day of the Muslim feast of Aid-i-Qurban (a day on which all Muslim believers must go to the mosque), a youth followed the example of the only Bashkir communist of the village, the manager of the club, and refrained from going to the mosque.

However, propaganda by deeds must not exclude verbal propaganda. The latter must be used, but only where the ground has already been prepared. For example, why not organize public discussions on religion aimed at Muslim

workers in the cities and then progressively spread out into the countryside. All this is possible, not only where verbal propaganda is concerned, but also for antireligious publications.

But it should never be forgotten that the principal difficulty as far as antireligious propaganda among the Muslims is concerned comes from their cultural backwardness and their political and moral degradation. The age-old oppression of Russian czarism left deep scars. Let us recall, as an example, that even after the formation of autonomous republics, the Muslims rarely participated in the administrative life of their republics. No antireligious propaganda will give the expected results as long as Muslims have not been liberated and made free and equal Soviet citizens, not only on paper, but also in fact. We must first of all improve public education in all its forms and at all levels, attract Muslims to the economic, administrative, and political agencies of the State wherever possible, and also spread and reinforce the work of the Party. All this is indispensable for success.

In conclusion we believe it would be useful to say a few words about the necessity of varying antireligious propaganda among the Muslims of Russia, according to their ethnic identity. This approach is necessary because of the great economic, social, and cultural differences among the different Muslim peoples of Russia. The general principles of antireligious propaganda previously discussed can only be applied to the problem as a whole. When it comes to dealing with the different ethnic groups, we must necessarily "individualize" and differentiate the propaganda, a task that would prove impossible without a knowledge of their particular customs and culture. The following analysis is a preliminary attempt in this regard.

## Special Working Conditions among the Tatars

Certain factors particular to work among the Tatars are negative and tend to complicate antireligious propaganda; other factors, being positive, tend to facilitate it. Among the negative factors we should note:

1. The strength of the Muslim clergy. The Tatar clergy (Volga, Urals, the Russian interior, and Siberia) is better organized than say, for example, the clergy of Kirghizia or of Turkestan. This strength is explained by the fact that it was always in the forefront of the struggle against the Russian missionaries—and this gave it a great deal of experience—and also by the fact that during the past few years the clergy has undergone a profound internal transformation on the personal and organizational levels.

The "personal" or internal transformation of the Tatar clergy was caused by the political pressure which the Young Turk intelligentsia brought to bear on it after the 1908 Revolution in Turkey. Later on we shall describe its characteristics and significance. The organizational reform took place after the February Revolution, and after various congresses, meetings, and conferences. The Muslem clergy modified its internal constitution, making it more staunch, more viable, more flexible, and more democratic, and placed at its head a new spiritual directorate of the Russian interior and of Siberia.

2. The internal psychological reaction provoked by the "propaganda" of the different Russian missionary associations and that of the "militants" of the Union of the Russian People. This "propaganda" met with the natural resistance of the Muslims and lent strength to their fanaticism. On this score we can recall the massive emigration of Tatars to Turkey at the time of the religious persecutions under Alexander III. The mark left by the activities of these associations is still there and it will take decades to eradicate it.

The positive factors are as follows:

1. The proletarization of the Tatar masses. This was relatively more advanced than among the other Muslim peoples of Russia. The poverty of the soil, poor harvests, constant famines, the weakness of local industries—both primary and secondary, all facilitated this proletarization by forcing Tatar workers to emigrate to the industrial regions of Russia.

Not long ago the number of Tatar workers in the coal basin of Krivoi-Rog-Donetz alone reached the figure of 100,000 persons. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Tatars work in the oil fields of Baku and Groznyi. Still others are to be found in great numbers in the factories of the Urals and in the gold mines of Siberia. Nearly half, if not more, of the dock workers on the River Belaia, the Lower Kama, and the Middle Volga wereTatars. One could meet them in faraway Murmansk and on the Amur where they worked in railway construction. Poverty drove them from one end of Russia to the other, from one mine to another, and the seeds of atheism were gradually sown in their souls. They had no time to think of Allah when hunger urged them to work. Uprooted from his homeland, leading a vagabond's life and taking his Russian companions as examples, the Tatar worker broke the bonds which tied him to his patriarchal life and thus destroyed the foundations of religious fanaticism.

2. A higher cultural level than that of other Muslim peoples of the Russian borderlands. The last fifteen to twenty years which preceded the revolution can be considered the era of national renaissance of the Volga Tatars. The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the revolutions of the Persian democrats and the young Turks contributed considerably to this awakening. From this time on, Turkestan and Bukhara, until then considered the cultural centers of the

Tatars but in reality nothing but hotbeds of cultural obscurantism and religious fanaticism, began to cede place to Constantinople, Beirut, and Cairo. On their return to Russia the Tatar students with degrees from the universities of these cities propagated new ideas, ideas of culture and of progress. The Tatar people, five million souls in a deep slumber who were designated by the Tatar writer Ayaz Iskhaki as "the degenerate people," began to awaken. A bitter struggle started between the *qadymists* (traditionalists) and the *jadids* (innovators). Denominational Muslim schools—*mekteps* and *medressehs*—underwent reform and introduced secular studies. In 1906 the first theatrical production in the Tatar language was performed at Kazan and gave rise to a storm of protest on the part of the reactionary Muslim clergy and the fanatics in the population. After the 1905 Revolution, the first newspapers in the Tatar language appeared. Soon a great many Tatar newspapers and reviews appeared in all the large Tatar centers: Kazan, Astrakhan, Orenburg, and Ufa, and later even in Moscow.

In turn Tatar literature appeared and several large printing houses were founded at Kazan. The problem of women was now raised. The innovators pressed for a ban on the veil. The clergy and the *qadymists* opposed these changes. The innovators were cursed and in certain regions the new schools they had founded were closed; the schoolbooks written in the Tatar language on secular subjects were burned; teachers were lynched, and so on. But all this was of no use, for finally the innovators prevailed. In the end we witnessed the appearance of Tatar literature, Tatar theater, and a national Tatar school. Tatar women discarded the veil; the clergy was subjected to pitiless social criticism by the satirical papers of the time (*Chukish, Yashyn, Qormaq,* and so on) which considered this problem to be of great importance. The struggle between the *qadymists* and the *jadids* also spread to the clergy. All that was reactionary, decadent, and fanatical gravitated toward the *qadymists;* all that was new, wholesome, and revolutionary was drawn to the *jadids*. Among the latter appeared the reformers—such as, for example, Musa Bigiev, Abdullah Bubi, and Ziya Kemali. Musa Bigiev published treatises concerning certain specific points of casuist Islamic theology in which he attacked the archaic positions of the *ulema* (fetwatists). In the work *Rehmet-i Ilahiye*, he criticized opinion established for centuries that paradise is reserved for Muslims alone and, basing his argument on certain *suras* of the Koran, proved that paradise is not reserved only for Muslims but also for those *kafirs* (infidels) who merit it. For the Muslim fanatic accustomed to viewing the *kafirs* as "damned," this interpretation was truly revolutionary. Bigiev wrote another work in which he condoned the nonobservance of the Muslim law of fasting. This also

provoked a storm of protests since until then the fanatical clergy, whose influence on the people was still too strong, had categorically rejected such a possibility.

Ziya Kemali and Abdullah Bubi were in the forefront of the struggle to reorganize the *medressehs*—upper and middle Muslim educational establishments. They founded Muslim upper schools where, alongside the study of the Shariy'at, "European" sciences were taught: mathematics, history, geography, natural sciences, social sciences. Before their involvement, the introduction of such subjects in parochial schools was considered to be real apostasy.

One *mullah*, a certain Ghafuri, in his brochure *İsabet*, even cast doubt on Muhammad's being a prophet. It is true that the author of this work was later taken back into the fold of Islam, but nevertheless his work left a deep impression on the Tatar conscience.

The reactionary section of the Tatar clergy endeavored to "preserve" Tatar society from these "young Muslims," at first by their rhetoric, and when this method proved ineffective, by ignoble denunciations to the czarist police accusing the innovators of "pan-Islamism," and so on. But all this was useless. Already, before the February Revolution, the fanatical reactionary clergy had ceased to be a political force and in its place appeared a new clergy, whose activity contributed to the weakening of the religious fanaticism of the Tatars.

3. The influence of the socialist revolution. The socialist revolution only served to deepen and enlarge the setting of the antireligious struggle among the Tatars. During the course of this struggle many former "revolutionaries" found themselves in the reactionary camp. The revolution also caused a schism in the ranks of the Tatar clergy. Two enemy camps were formed—on one side the "Red" *mullahs*, supporters of Soviet power, and on the other, the "White" *mullahs*, supporters of Kolchak and the Constituent Assembly, who, although in outward appearance recognized Soviet power, in reality worked underhandedly against us. It should be noted that everywhere the reactionary *mullahs* allied themselves with the counterrevolutionary Russian clergy, thus forming a "united front" against the "communist *mullahs*." As an example one could cite the peasant uprisings in the spring of 1920 in the districts (*uezd*) of Menzelinsk, Belebei, and Bugul'ma, where the insurgents shot not only communists but also Tatar teachers and *jadid mullahs*.

We can conclude this account by saying that, among the Tatars, the time was ripe for antireligious propaganda and good results can be expected. In this instance the favorable factors outweigh the negative ones.

## The Work in Bashkiria

The situation in Bashkiria is somewhat different. Here there is less of an attachment to religious fanaticism but at the same time traces of the superstitions of ancient animism are stronger. The weakness of fanaticism among the Bashkirs is explained by several reasons. The principal one is that the Bashkirs are still in the nomadic stage and they preserve the elements of tribal life. The example of the Kirghiz, the Turkomans, and the Arab Bedouin proves that the nomadic life never favored the development of religious fanaticism. All observers, westerners as well as easterners, have noted this. And this is easily understood. Nomadism puts man face to face with nature and, in the constant struggle for survival, leaves him little time to think of religion, much less to perform religious rites. We know that all religions are born in cities and only later spread to the countryside and desert.

A second factor restrained religious fanaticism among the Bashkirs: the fact that they did not receive Islam directly from the Arabs or the Persians, but from the Tatars, to whom they had already begun to assimilate culturally before their conversion to Islam. Among them, the Tatar *mullah* was the pioneer of Islam. It is easy to understand that, under these conditions, Islam was a foreign religion, artificially imposed. Finally, we should recall the class and racial antagonism between Tatars and Bashkirs due to purely economic factors: the more advanced Tatars oppressed the Bashkirs. Given this state of affairs, the Tatar *mullah* could have little influence on the Bashkir *auls*, and in the first serious conflict between the Bashkirs and Tatars (especially after the February Revolution, when the Bashkirs proclaimed themselves independent of the Tatars, and the Tatars opposed this), the Tatar *mullah* lost his position and his head. We know that, at certain times, the massacres of *mullahs* and of Tatar teachers in Bashkir villages took on a chronic character. Otherwise, the Bashkir attachment to superstitions can be explained by their cultural backwardness. Suffice it to recall that to this day they still have no literary language and always use Tatar. Literature, theater, and art all come to them via the Tatars.

The grounds for antireligious propaganda therefore do exist in Bashkiria. We must only make them more fertile.

## The Work in Kirghizia (Kazakhstan)

The best results of antireligious propaganda should be looked for in Kirghizia. The nomadic Kirghiz are less inclined to religious prejudice and to fanaticism

than the other peoples. Their conversion to Islam is reminiscent of that of the Bashkirs. Among the Kirghiz the clergy was exclusively Tatar (Kirghizia was subject to the Spiritual Assembly of Orenburg), and we must note as well that these were the weakest elements among the Tatar *mullahs*—the real dregs—who went there. Every summer the Tatar Muslim denominational schools sent an incalculable number of *shakirds* (seminarians) to Kirghizia with the intention of exploiting the naive Kirghiz in the name of religion. Those Tatars who, among their own could not even become *farrash* (mosque caretaker) there became *mullah-eka* (religious director). It is obvious that in this situation they could hardly create anything solid or durable. Also the morals and customs of the Kirghiz were untouched by outside influence. In Kirghizia Islam was not even able to alter the position of women. Whereas everywhere else they were reduced to the rank of slave, in Kirghizia women retained their liberty. The judicial limitations to which they were subject were customary in character and not religious.

## Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara

Working conditions in this region are completely different from those we encounter among the Tatars, the Bashkirs, or the Kirghiz. Until recently, Bukhara remained one of the main centers of religious fanaticism in Central Asia and its influence in Turkestan and at Khiva is still enormous. These territories have not yet crossed the evolutionary stage through which the Tatars have already gone. Literature, theater, and art, just recently developed among the Sarts [Uzbeks], are embryonic among the Bukharians and the Khivians. It was not until after the October Revolution that the Sarts saw the first secular school; among the Bukharians and the Khivians they have just been established, thanks, moreover to Tatar and Turkish intellectuals. The position of women has not yet been altered. The antagonism which we notice between the Sarts and the Bukharians on the one hand and the Tatars on the other is basically due to the fact that the fight against religious fanaticism and cultural backwardness in Turkestan was directed by the Tatars.

Only recently, in 1918, the Bukharian clergy, with the emir at its head, organized a grandiose pogrom against Tatars, massacring more than five thousand persons accused of being *jadids*. To fully appreciate the strength of Islam in Bukhara it is enough to recall that even after the Soviet regime was inaugurated the Shariy'at continued to be applied in many areas (for example, the system of duty in kind). It is true that in this regard the position of

Turkestan is somewhat different. Ever since the Russian conquest the position of Turkestan has been somewhat different; religion no longer takes the place of civil and administrative law. Nonetheless, religious fanaticism is still very strong there and the antireligious struggle more difficult and complicated than in Tatarstan and Kirghizia.

The antireligious campaign can only be waged there with the methods used by the *jadids* between 1905 and 1910 in the region of the Volga.

### Azerbaidzhan, the Caucasus, the Crimea

As far as organizing antireligious propaganda is concerned, the position of Azerbaidzhan is more favorable than that of Turkestan. The proximity of Turkey, a more highly developed industry, the existence of a more or less conscious indigenous proletariat, and finally the more precocious cultural awakening (the first Tatar language newspapers appeared in Azerbaidzhan twenty-five to thirty years ago, whereas in Turkestan, the first newspaper in the Sart language was only published in 1915; we do not count the government newspaper published by the missionaries)—all this puts Azerbaidzhan several decades ahead of Turkestan and Bukhara. The evolution of Azerbaidzhan is comparable to that of the Tatars of the Volga, even though it is slower. It is certainly easier to spread antireligious propaganda there than in Turkestan or Bukhara.

In the Crimea we encounter the same favorable conditions. Here conditions are even more auspicious than in Azerbaidzhan, for religious fanaticism is even weaker. The Crimea occupies a position midway between Azerbaidzhan and Tatarstan.

The situation is more difficult in Daghestan and among the mountain peoples of the Caucasus. The traces of the recent İmamate (of Shamil and others), the maintenance of the *'adat* (customary law), the absence of any national literature (replaced by Arabic literature), and finally political and religious isolation—all this explains why the attachment to religious prejudice is stronger here than in the other Muslim regions of the Russian borderlands. Suffice it to recall that Shariy'at courts have recently been introduced in Daghestan and in many regions of the Republic of the Mountain Peoples. During the Civil War one could see villages and even whole tribes of mountain peoples taking part in the battle against the troops of Bicharahov and Denikin on the side of the Soviet forces, solely for religious motives: "Soviet power gives us greater religious liberty than the Whites," they said. In the ranks of the Red Army of the Caucasus are found Shariy'at squadrons and

units (the Shariy'at squadrons of the Kabardian *mullah* Katkakhanov numbered several tens of thousands of combatants).

The goundwork for antireligious propaganda is not yet prepared, or else is as yet only very superficially so.

In closing and summing up our article, we must repeat that Islam is different from other religions in substance and because of its history, and that other methods of propaganda are necessary to fight it. But it is also necessary to adopt special methods for each Muslim nationality according to its own particular geographic, historical, cultural, social, and economic characteristics; those which work well with the Tatars are worthless for the Kirghiz, those suitable for the Muslims of Russia are not applicable in Afghanistan or Bukhara, and vice versa. Tactics appropriate to each one of them are necessary, tailored to their psychology and ethos. One of the most pressing tasks in our work of agitation and propaganda in the East should be a detailed, in-depth study of this problem on the spot, and a serious analysis of it in the Party press. Without the effort we will never be able to find solid footing and neither will we be able to solve the problems facing us; we will never be able to extricate ourselves from our present state of mental anarchy.